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Abstract. An initialisation process is a key component in modern stream
cipher design. A well-designed initialisation process should ensure that
each key-IV pair generates a different keystream. In this paper, we anal-
yse two ciphers, A5/1 and Mixer, for which this does not happen due to
state convergence. We show how the state convergence problem occurs
and estimate the effective key-space in each case.
1 Introduction
Modern stream cipher applications use a secret key and an initialisation vec-
tor (IV) to form an initial internal state before keystream generation begins.
A good initialisation process should ensure that each key-IV pair generates a
distinct keystream. This is possible for recent proposals where the state size is
large enough but may not be the case for older designs. This paper analyses two
stream ciphers, A5/1 and Mixer, where state convergence occurs during initial-
isation, resulting in different key-IV pairs producing the same keystream. We
show how state convergence occurs in each case and demonstrate that increas-
ing the number of iterations in the initialisation process effectively decreases the
security provided.
2 Background and Notation
Keystream generators for stream ciphers operate by maintaining an internal state
and applying update and output functions to the state. In many cases, the state
space is provided by a combination of linear and/or nonlinear feedback shift
registers (LFSR/NLFSR respectively). In this paper, we consider two ciphers
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the notation Rt[i] to denote the contents of stage i of register R at time t where
i = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1, for an r-bit register. The state S of a stream cipher is of size
s bits. For the two ciphers examined in this paper, s is the sum of the component
register lengths.
Modern keystream generators take two inputs: a secret key and an IV, of size
l and j bits respectively. A stream cipher with an l-bit key and a j-bit IV has a
keyspace of 2l bits and an IV-space of 2j bits. Let k0, k1, . . . kl−1 represent the
l-bit key and v0, v1, . . . vj−1 represent the j-bit IV. Before keystream generation
commences, a key-IV pair is used to form an internal state value. This process
is referred to as initialisation and can be considered as a mapping from binary
vectors of length l + j to those of length s.
The purpose of the initialisation process is to diffuse the key-IV pair across
the entire state and make mathematical relationships between the key-IV pair
and the keystream hard to establish. The initialisation process is often performed
in three phases: key-loading, IV-loading and the diffusion phase. In the key-
loading and IV-loading phase, the secret key and IV are transferred to the stream
cipher’s state. When both the secret key and IV have been transferred, the stream
cipher is in its “loaded state”. Following this, the diffusion phase begins. This is
generally the most complex phase and it is important, as using the loaded state
directly to begin keystream generation could make the stream cipher vulnerable
to correlation attacks. The diffusion phase consists of a number of iterations,
denoted α in this paper, of the initialisation state-update function. Each iteration
of the initialisation state-update function can be considered as a function which
maps the state space to itself. This mapping should be one-to-one and nonlinear
in nature. After the initialisation process is complete, the keystream generator
is said to be in its initial state.
To prevent time-memory-data tradeoff attacks, modern stream ciphers have
internal states which are at least the size of the key-IV pair. That is, 2s ≥ 2l+j .
Since the state space is at least the size of the space spanned by all key-IV
pairs, it is reasonable to expect that the initialisation process will be one-to-one,
that is, each distinct key-IV pair should map to a distinct state at the end of
initialisation.
Some initialisation processes are not one-to-one. Considering the state-update
function in the forwards direction, for a given St, there is a single St+1. However,
when considering the reverse direction, for a given value of St+1, there may be
multiple values for St. That is, multiple states converge during one iteration of
the initialisation state update function. If this state convergence occurs at any
point during the initialisation process, the same initial state will be attained
at the end of initialisation. Multiple distinct key-IV pairs will then generate the
same keystream. This could leave the stream cipher vulnerable to ciphertext-only
attacks [4] or time-memory-data tradeoff attacks [1].
One key factor to consider when designing the initialisation process is the
number of iterations of the initialisation state-update function to be performed.
A small number can be performed quickly, which may be desirable in applica-
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few iterations may not provide sufficient diffusion and could leave the cipher vul-
nerable to attacks, including correlation and algebraic attacks. Many iterations
might provide resistance to attacks, but the time taken to re-key could make
it unsuitable for real-time applications. Therefore, it is important to balance
security and performance when designing stream cipher initialisation functions.
Where state convergence occurs during initialisation, increasing the number of
iterations can reduce both the rekeying efficiency and the security provided by
the cipher. State convergence results in multiple key-IV pairs producing the same
keystream at the end of initialisation. A user who encrypts multiple messages
and chooses a different key-IV pair cannot now be sure that this will result in a
distinct keystream for each message. Clearly, this is not desirable.
3 Case Studies
3.1 A5/1 stream cipher
Description of A5/1. A5/1 [3] is a bit based stream cipher based on three
LFSRs, denoted A, B and C, with lengths of 19, 22 and 23 bits respectively,
giving a state size of 64 bits. Each LFSR has a primitive feedback polynomial. A
single 64-bit secret key is used for each conversation and a 22-bit frame number
is used as the IV. The three registers are regularly clocked during loading of
the key and IV (frame number), while a majority clocking mechanism is used
for the diffusion phase and for keystream generation. This is the only nonlinear
operation performed.
To implement the majority clocking scheme, each register has a clocking tap:
stages At[8], Bt[10] and Ct[10]. The contents of these stages determine which
registers will be clocked at the next iteration: Those registers for which the
clock control bits agree with the majority value are clocked. For example, if
At[8] = 0, Bt[10] = 1 and Ct[10] = 0, then the majority value is 0 and registers
A and C are clocked. Thus, either two or three registers are clocked at each step.
Figure 1 shows the components of the A5/1 keystream generator, including the
feedback taps and the clocking tap for each register.
Initialisation Process. Prior to loading, all stages of the three registers are set
to zero. Each register is autonomous during key and IV loading. Each register
is regularly clocked 64 times and each key bit, ki, is XORed with the register
feedback to form the new value of stage 0. Following this, each register is regularly
clocked 22 times as the IV is loaded in the same manner [2].
The diffusion phase involves performing 100 iterations of the initialisation
state update function using the majority clocking scheme. At the end of this
phase an initial state is obtained.
Previous Work. Few previous analyses of A5/1 focussed specifically on the
effect of state convergence during initialisation. Two papers that deal with this
4Fig. 1. A5/1 Stream cipher.
topic as part of a broader analysis are Golic´ [6] (based on [5]) and Biryukov,
Shamir and Wagner [2].
Golic´ [6] considered the inverse mapping for the majority clocking function
and identified some states with no pre-image and which therefore cannot be
reached from any loaded state in a single iteration. He demonstrated that these
states comprise 38 of the loaded states of the system. Thus, the usable state space
shrinks by a factor of 58 (from 2
64 to 5 × 261 ≈ 263.32) at the first iteration of
the diffusion phase. Golic´ also identified some states with unique pre-images and
others with up to four pre-image states. Figure 2 presents a graphical summary of
the six cases identified by Golic´. In this figure, (Ri, Rj , Rk) is any permutation of
the set {A,B,C} of registers and the shaded stage in each register is its clocking
tap. The symbol x represents either 0 or 1, while # represents the complement
of x; a blank square represents a bit which can take either value.
Fig. 2. A5/1 pre-image cases
The proportion of loaded states for each case in Figure 2 is presented in
Table 1, along with the corresponding number of pre-images. Note that the case
identified as (i) cannot be clocked back to any valid state. That is, states of this
5form cannot be reached after the first iteration of the initialisation state update
function.
Case (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Proportion of states 38
3
8
1
32
3
32
3
32
1
32
Number of pre-images 0 1 1 2 3 4
Table 1. Proportions of states in each of Golic´’s cases
Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner [2] also provide convergence estimates when
exploring the efficiency of their attack. They report that, of 108 randomly chosen
states, only about 15% can be clocked back 100 iterations. That is, 85% of states
could not be reached by a 100 iteration forward clocking process.
Our analysis. As the total size of key and IV for A5/1 (64 + 22 = 86 bits)
exceeds the 64 bit state size, a degree of compression occurs during the loading
phases of initialisation. In fact, as the state-update function is linear during the
loading phases, it can be shown that there are 222 key-IV pairs corresponding
to each possible loaded state.
Nonlinear operations in the state-update function are introduced during the
diffusion phase via majority clocking. However, this also introduces state con-
vergence. (This convergence continues into the keystream generation stage but
this is beyond the scope of this paper.) This effect was reported by Golic´ [5, 6]
and quantified to some extent by Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner [2]. Our analysis
supports and extends these results.
Golic´’s results demonstrate that the majority clocking process is not one-to-
one and can result in state convergence in one iteration. We extend Golic´’s logic
to identify the states which cannot be reached after each of the first six itera-
tions of the diffusion phase. We show that state convergence continues with each
iteration, though not uniformly at each iteration, contrary to Golic´’s assump-
tions [6]. Some of the inaccessible states we identified for multiple iterations are
presented in Figure 3.
We now sketch the reasoning used to identify states that are inaccessible
after two iterations. We use the term “downstream” to refer to the stages in
Figure 2 and 3 that are to the left of the clocking stages. By reversing the logic
of the majority clocking process, the following conditions apply when we invert
an iteration:
1. A state obtained by clocking a pair of registers must have the contents of the
stages immediately downstream of the clocking bit in these registers identical
in value to one another, and different in value from the clocking bit of the
third register.
62. A state obtained by clocking all three registers must have the contents of
the stages immediately downstream of the clocking tap identical in all three
registers.
Fig. 3. Inaccessible states for various numbers of iterations (steps)
For Figure 2, we note that condition 1 applies to case (ii), condition 2 applies
to case (iii), both conditions apply to cases (iv) to (vi), but neither applies to
case (i). In cases (iv), (v) and (vi), condition 1 applies to different numbers of
the three possible pairs of registers.
Applying this logic to the pattern labelled “2 steps” in Figure 3 shows that
such a state can arise only by clocking a combination of registers that includes
register Rk. But this implies that any previous state belongs to case (i) of Figure
2 (possibly with additional values specified among the clocking bits). Since case
(i) cannot be reached by the first clocking step, this “2 steps” state cannot be
reached at the subsequent clocking step. (Note: it can, however, be reached by
the first clocking step, since case (i) is a valid loaded state.)
We now show that this pattern is the only inaccessible pattern at this step.
Any state which is inaccessible after two iterations must clock back only to states
that were inaccessible after the first step. So all such states must be contained
in the image space (under clocking) of case (i) above. This image space can be
found by completing the unspecified values in case (i) in all possible ways and
applying the clocking rule to each (see Figure 4(a)). When this is done, we find
that many of the image states are accessible, as they have multiple pre-images,
some of which are accessible (see Figure 4(b) for an example). If we discard
these states and retain those which can clock back only to case (i), we find that
the pattern presented above is indeed the only new inaccessible pattern at the
second step.
A similar process can be followed to identify inaccessible patterns after α
iterations. There is a branching tree of patterns for these inaccessible states: as
well as the two “3 step” patterns presented in Figure 3, there are five distinct
patterns at the fourth iteration, 17 at the fifth iteration and many more at each
subsequent iteration. Table 2 presents the cumulative proportion of inaccessible
states (out of all possible loaded states) after each of the first six iterations,
together with the corresponding proportion and number of accessible states.
7Fig. 4. Determining inaccessible states at the second step:(a) Results of clocking
case (i) forwards. (b) Possible pre-images for one of these results
α (number of iterations) 1 2 3 4 5 6
new proportion 3
8
3
64
9
512
57
4096
423
32768
6453
524288inaccessible
cumulative proportion
0.375 0.422 0.439 0.453 0.466 0.479
inaccessible
proportion accessible 0.625 0.578 0.561 0.547 0.534 0.521
number of accessible
263.322 263.209 263.165 263.129 263.094 263.061
states
Table 2. Proportion of available states after α iterations
The number and complexity of the patterns obtained so far indicates that
obtaining a general expression for the number of accessible states after a given
number of iterations is not a simple task for large values. Extrapolating from
the known values in Table 2 provides an approximation. Using an exponential
extrapolation based on 2–6 iterations, we obtain an approximation of the pro-
portion of accessible states after 100 iterations of around 5% of the number of
loaded states.
Another approach to determining the extent of state convergence over the en-
tire diffusion phase is to perform exhaustive experimental evaluation of a scaled-
down version with three LFSRs and a majority clocking arrangement, but only
a 15-bit internal state. (LFSR lengths of 4, 5 and 6 bits were used.) All possible
loaded states were used and the number of distinct states remaining after each
iteration was recorded. Results for small numbers of iterations align very closely
with those reported in Table 2, while the proportion of distinct states observed
after 100 iterations was found to be 627832768 = 19.2% of the original number. This
is similar to Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner’s [2] results for random sampling
with A5/1 itself.
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initialisation process (and also during keystream generation) as a result of the
majority clocking operation. Increasing the number of iterations in the diffusion
phase results in a further reduction of the total number of distinct initial states,
decreasing both security and efficiency.
The total number of distinct internal states of A5/1 is reduced to approxi-
mately half of the loaded value after six iterations. This is equivalent to a loss
of around one bit of its internal state. After 100 iterations, the total number of
distinct states is potentially reduced to 15%–20% of the number of loaded states
(i.e. effective key space of 261.26–261.68).
3.2 Mixer
Description of Mixer. Mixer is a bit-based stream cipher proposed by Kanso
[7] which uses a 128-bit key and a 64-bit IV. The keystream generator is based on
two shift registers, denoted A and B, of lengths 128-bits and 89-bits respectively,
giving a total state size of 217 bits. Figure 5 illustrates the components of Mixer
and their interaction during both initialisation (includes both solid and dotted
lines) and keystream generation (solid lines are used only). A is a regularly
clocked LFSR and B is an irregularly clocked NLFSR which is controlled by A
as follows. An integer function, FINT , takes the contents of w stages of A as
input and outputs an integer c(b): the number of times B is to be clocked. The
Mixer specification does not fix the value for w or specify the tap positions for
FINT , but recommends that w ∈ {2, 3, . . . 7} be used for efficiency reasons.
Although the feedback function of B is nonlinear, it can be approximated by
a linear function with very high probability. We take this approach. A nonlinear
Boolean function, g(x), takes inputs from five stages of A to determine whether
the output of B will be used or discarded.
Select/Discard
g(x)
B(x)
A(x)
FINT
NLFSR BLFSR A
Fig. 5. Mixer state update functions
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the key is loaded into A such that A[i] = ki, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127 and the IV is loaded
into B such that B[j] = vj , for 0 ≤ j ≤ 63. The remaining stages of B are
filled with ones. The diffusion phase involves performing 200 iterations of the
initialisation state update function. Each iteration is performed as follows:
1. Clock register A once.
2. For the updated state At+1, calculate:
(a) The integer value ct+1(b) using FINT .
(b) The output of the nonlinear Boolean function gt+1(x)
3. Clock register B ct+1(b) times.
4. If gt+1(x) = 0 then this iteration is complete.
5. If gt+1(x) = 1 then XOR the output bit of B (after ct+1(b) clocks) with the
contents of both register stages A[127] and B[88].
We refer to the XOR operation in Step 5 as the mixing operation. This is the
only operation in the initialisation process where the contents of the two registers
are directly combined. The output bit from B which is XORed is referred to as
the mixing bit, and denoted m. During initialisation no keystream is produced.
After 200 iterations of the above process, Mixer is in an initial state and is ready
to begin keystream generation.
Our Analysis. The total key-IV space of Mixer (128 + 64 bits) indicates the
potential for 2192 distinct initial states. However, this does not occur. Our analy-
sis of the initialisation process begins with the observation that the state update
function is not one-to-one. In this section we examine the state convergence dur-
ing one iteration of the initialisation state update function, and across multiple
iterations of the initialisation process.
The Mixer initialisation state update function requires calculation of g(x),
as the update of A[127] and B[88] with the mixing value m is conditional on the
value of g(x). The possibilities for the state transitions from St to St+1 are:
1. g(x) = 0. No mixing operation occurs, regardless of the value of m.
2. g(x) = 1 and m = 0. The mixing operation occurs but the contents of
A[127] and B[88] remain unchanged after the mixing operation. That is, the
outcome is the same as when g(x) = 0.
3. g(x) = 1 and m = 1: The mixing operation occurs, and the contents of
A[127] and B[88] are complemented.
A is an LFSR with a primitive feedback function and g(x) is a balanced nonlinear
Boolean function. If A was autonomous, then the probability that g(x) = 1 would
be very close to 0.5. After the first iteration the feedback from B complicates
this. However, assuming this probability is still very close to 0.5 and considering
the four possible combinations of g(x) and m values, effective mixing occurs with
a probability of 0.25.
Consider inverting the initialisation state update function. That is, given St+1
we want to obtain St. Recall that A is a regularly clocked LFSR, which controls
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the clocking of B. The value of gt+1(x) is readily calculated. The possibilities
for the state transitions from St+1 to St are conditional on gt+1(x) and m:
1. gt+1(x) = 0. No mixing occurred. In this case, we use At+1 to calculate
ct+1(b), and clock A back once and B back ct+1(b) times.
2. gt+1(x) = 1. Mixing has occurred, but the effect depends on the value of m:
(a) If m = 0 then again use At+1 to calculate ct+1(b), and clock A back once
and B back ct+1(b) times.
(b) If m = 1 then complement both At+1[127] and Bt+1[88], and then use
At+1 to calculate ct+1(b), and clock A back once and B back ct+1(b)
times.
The difficulty in inverting the state update function lies with computing the value
of m. We cannot obtain this directly from Bt+1 as it is discarded from B after
the mixing operation. Therefore, given g(x) = 1 we consider two possibilities (m
equals 0 or 1). Thus there are two possible previous states. Figure 6 shows the
format of two states at time t which converge to the same state at time t + 1.
Note that x′ and m′ represent the complements of x and m respectively. The
contents of the other register stages must be the same.
NLFSR BLFSR A
LFSR A NLFSR B
x
x′
S1t
S2t
m
c(b) clocks
c(b) clocks
m′
Fig. 6. States which converge to the same next state.
For the first iteration of the diffusion phase 50% of all loaded states have
g(x) = 0. Each of these produces a distinct next state. For the other 50% g(x) = 1
and these states can be grouped into pairs that converge to the same next state.
Thus, after the first iteration of the state update function, the number of distinct
states is only 75% of the number of loaded states.
At the next iteration, we consider firstly those states for which g1(x) = 0.
Applying the argument above, after the second iteration the number of distinct
states is 75% of the size of this group. For the states where g1(x) = 1, the pairing
argument may not hold (some of the relevant states may have been eliminated
in the previous iteration) so the number of remaining states may be more than
75%.
Combining these results gives upper and lower bounds on the number of
distinct states after two iterations of 62.5% and 56.25% of the number of loaded
states, respectively. Continuing these arguments for α iterations gives upper and
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lower bounds on the proportion of states remaining as nupper =
N
2 (1 + 2
−α) and
nlower = N × 0.75α where N is the number of loaded states.
As an alternative approach to estimating the degree of state convergence,
we ran some computer simulations for a reduced-round diffusion phase. We set
w = 2 and took inputs to FINT from A[70] and A[71]. In our experiments, 100
loaded states were randomly generated. For each loaded state, α iterations of
the Mixer initialisation process were performed, for α = 1, 2, . . . , 30. We refer to
the initial state resulting from this process as the target initial state. For each
value of α and for each target obtained, the state was clocked back α times and
all loaded states which generate the same target were recovered.
Data corresponding to α = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 have been collated to
form Table 3. For each value of α, the table includes:
– The total number (Total) of loaded states found for all 100 target states.
– The minimum number (Min) and maximum number (Max) of loaded states
found for any target.
– The mean and standard deviation (S.D) of the number of loaded states for
each target state.
α Total Min Max Mean S.D
5 766 1 32 7.66 6.47
10 3327 2 256 33.27 35.072
15 8120 2 1024 81.2 96.522
20 14239 4 1152 142.39 149.068
25 20328 4 1344 203.28 211.736
30 23180 4 1848 231.8 242.39
Table 3. Number of Mixer loaded states for 100 random targets.
The table clearly shows that as α increases, the number of loaded states
corresponding to a target also increases. That is, the number of loaded states
which converge to a particular initial state increases with α. Also, it is clear that
the rate of state convergence is not uniform across all key-IV pairs which form
the loaded states.
From our experiments, we plotted a graph of the mean number of loaded
states per target, n, against α. Two versions of this experiment were run:
one in which candidate loaded states must conform to the specifications (with
B[64], . . . , B[88] = 1, 1, . . . , 1) and another without this restriction. These are
labelled Format check and No Format check respectively in Figure 7. For ref-
erence, the figure also includes the graphs of two other curves: n = 1.25α and
n = 1.5α.
Our experimental sample size of 100 trials represents a very small fraction
of the 2192 possible loaded states. This, coupled with the non-uniform rate of
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Fig. 7. Mean number of loaded states per target for various α.
convergence, may have affected the accuracy of our estimate of the number of
loaded states converging to each target after α iterations.
Summary. State convergence during the diffusion phase is largely due to the
mixing operation. This operation results in convergence at each iteration, reduc-
ing the number of distinct states by a factor of between 0.75 and 1.0. Increasing
the number of iterations in the diffusion phase results in a further reduction in
the number of distinct states. Both theoretical and experimental results support
this. Further analysis on the effect larger w values or different tap positions has
on state convergence remains future work.
4 Discussion
Traditional stream cipher designs used a state space of equal size to that of the
secret key. For applications that make use of an IV as well as a key, the state
space of these ciphers is less than the key-IV space, so it is clear that compression
will occur. That is, multiple key-IV pairs will produce the same keystream. For
some ciphers, this is further compounded by state convergence, reducing the
effective key size. This was the case for A5/1 where both compression and further
convergence occur.
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Modern stream ciphers have much larger state space. This permits a designer
to avoid the compression issue associated with traditional designs as each key-IV
pair can map to a distinct loaded state. However, problems with state conver-
gence may still occur if the initialisation process is not carefully considered. It is
crucial that the state-update function during initialisation is one-to-one. This is
exactly the problem for Mixer. The compression problem experienced with A5/1
is avoided but the convergence problem remains.
Where state convergence does occur, it might not occur uniformly across all
possible keys. For example, it is possible that only a single key-IV pair generates
a particular initial state and associated keystream, while another initial state
could have been generated by many key-IV pairs. Thus, not all keystreams are
equally likely. This observation has implications for the effectiveness of time-
memory-data tradeoff (TMDT) attacks.
During the pre-computation phase of a TMDT attack, for a given IV an
attacker selects a few keys and generates a length of keystream corresponding to
each key. This key-keystream pair is stored in a lookup table. During the real-
time phase, the attacker compares a segment of keystream they have obtained
with the entries in the lookup table. If there is a match, the attacker assumes the
key corresponding to the matching segment is the correct key. If the initialisation
process was one-to-one, the attacker would be able to use this secret key with
the other IVs to correctly decrypt other messages. However, if the initialisation
process was not one-to-one, it is possible for the key the attacker obtains is not
the correct key but one that also produces the same initial state when used with
the given IV. For an alternative IV, the two keys may not result in the same
initial state, resulting in the incorrect decryption of other messages. That is,
if the initialisation process is one-to-one, the TMDT attack is a deterministic
attack. However, if the initialisation process is not one-to-one, the TMDT attack
may be a probabilistic attack.
The overall security provided by a stream cipher with state convergence prob-
lems is also directly related to the number of distinct initial states that can be
obtained as a result of the initialisation process. That is, we need to consider the
total number of key-IV pairs and the total number of distinct initial states. If the
state convergence is such that the total number of distinct initial states is less
than the total number of key-IV pairs, then it is possible that the same secret
key with different IVs will produce the same keystream. If the total number of
distinct initial states is less than the total number of keys, then clearly for any
given IV there will be multiple keys that produce the same keystream, so the
effective keyspace is reduced.
5 Conclusion
A common belief in symmetric key cryptography is that increasing the num-
ber of iterations of a nonlinear process increases the security provided by the
cipher. This is accompanied by a corresponding decrease in efficiency. For some
applications, an appropriate tradeoff can be identified. However where the non-
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linear function is not one-to-one, as in the case of A5/1 and Mixer, increasing
the number of iterations decreases the efficiency of the rekeying process with no
corresponding increase in security.
Stream cipher proposals usually include both design specifications and an
analysis section outlining resistance against common attacks. The focus of the
security analysis is generally only on the cipher’s keystream generation function.
Less attention is paid to the analysis of the initialisation process. We recommend
that stream cipher designers consider carefully the design of the initialisation
process, and perform sufficient analysis to ensure that state update function is
one-to-one so that state convergence does not occur.
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